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Abstract
This Article considers the Commission’s initial step toward a Community bill of rights-its
1979 proposal for accession to the European Convention. That proposal was prompted in large
measure by a 1974 decision of the German Constitutional Court. Due to the importance of this
rulings for Community human rights jurisprudence, their significance and substance are examined
in some detail in Part II of the Article. In Part III, the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter
is contrasted with the Community Charter, the former document having been signed, though not
ratified, by all twelve Community Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 1989, the Commission of the European Com-
munities (the "Commission") took its second major step in ten
years toward a Community bill of rights by submitting a draft
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights to the
Council of Ministers of the European Communities (the
"Council of Ministers" or the "Council").' The first step was
its 1979 proposal to the Council of Ministers that the Euro-
pean Community (the "Community" or the "EC") should ac-
cede to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, a document designed primarily to protect
classic civil and political rights rather than economic and social
* Legal Officer, U.N. Administrative Tribunal; Jervey Fellow, Wein Fellow, Co-
lumbia University; L.L.M., Columbia University, 1984; J.D., Vanderbilt University,
1980; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1977. The views expressed herein are those of the
Author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. The Author is
indebted to Bernard Paulin, formerly of the Legal Service, Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, and to Professor Alejandro Garro, Columbia Law School, for
making this research possible. She also wishes to thank Professor George Bermann
of Columbia Law School, Professor Matthias Herdegen of Bonn University, Dr.
Rainer Hofmann of the Max-Planck Institute fir auslindisches Recht und Volker-
recht, and Dr. Ulrich W61ker of the Legal Service, Commission of the European
Communities for helpful comments during the preparation of this Article.
1. COM(89) 471 final, 2 Oct. 1989, adopted by the Commission of the European
Communities [hereinafter Commission] on Sept. 27, 1989 [hereinafter Draft Com-
munity Charter]. The Council of Social Affairs Ministers amended the text on Octo-
ber 30, 1989, before submission to the European Council in Strasbourg, a body sepa-
rate and distinct from the Council of Ministers of the European Community.
"Community," "European Community," and "EC" will be used throughout this
Article to refer to the three separate Communities: European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European
Economic Community (EEC). Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, April 18, 1951, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140
[hereinafter ECSC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I & II), 298 U.N.T.S. 169
(1958).
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rights. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights
(the "Community Charter"), adopted by an eleven-to-one ma-
jority of the European Council at its December 8-9, 1989 meet-
ing in Strasbourg,2 contains thirty articles elaborating ten basic
social and economic "rights" of workers and citizens: (1) free-
dom of movement; (2) employment and remuneration; (3) im-
provement of living and working conditions; (4) social protec-
tion; (5) freedom of association and collective bargaining; (6)
vocational training; (7) equal treatment for men and women;
(8) workers' right to information, consultation, and participa-
tion; (9) health and safety protection at the workplace; and (10)
protection of children and adolescents, elderly persons, and
disabled persons.
The Community Charter is significant for several reasons,
the most important being the recognition that constitutional-
ization of fundamental rights-civil and political as well as eco-
nomic and social-is an essential feature of a choate federal
system. The Single European Act, 3 in the view of some schol-
ars a weak compromise to the European Parliament's (the
"Parliament") 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union,4 omits
that body's recommendation that the Community consider ac-
cession to both the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the "European
Convention on Human Rights") 5 and the European Social
Charter.6
2. The Charter was adopted over the objection of the United Kingdom. See
Agence Europe, Dec. 11-12, 1989, No. 5151, at 3; European File, Community Charter
of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, May 1990, at 2 [hereinafter Community
Charter].
3. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
21,000. See generally Jacqu6, L Acte unique europen, 22 REV. TRIM. DE DROIT EUROPkEN
575 (1986); Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the Single European Act, 24 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 361 (1987); Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 446 (1987); Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution
for the Community?, 27 COLUM.J. TRANS. L. 529 (1989) (all discussing Single European
Act).
4. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, OJ. C 77/33 (1984) [herein-
after Draft Treaty]; see F. CAPOTORTI, M. HILF, F. JACOBS &J.-P. JACQuk., THE EURO-
PEAN UNION TREATY (1986) (trans., LE TRAITt D'UNION EUROPfENNE (1985)); R.
BEIBER, J.-P. JACQU & J. WEILER, AN EVER CLOSER UNION (1984); Jacqu6, The Draft
Treaty Establishing the European Union, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 19 (1985).
5. Opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights].
6. Opened for signature Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
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Both the European Convention on Human Rights and the
European Social Charter were concluded under the auspices of
the Council of Europe, the twenty-one member state organiza-
tion which includes all twelve EC Member States. While the
preamble to the Single European Act acknowledges "the fun-
damental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of
Member States, in the [European Convention on Human
Rights], and the European Social Charter, notably freedom,
equality, and social justice," it does not contain the Parlia-
ment's proposal that a declaration on fundamental rights tai-
lored to the Community's needs be adopted.7 The Community
Charter begins the process to meet the Parliament's demands
(however inadequate Parliament believes it to be)' despite its
disclaimer that "the implementation of the Charter must not
entail an extension of the Community's powers as defined by
the Treaties."9
On a jurisprudential level, the Community Charter chal-
lenges the Community's adoption, in fact if not in theory, of
British common law creation of constitutional principles. It el-
evates judicial decisions to the level of a primary source of law,
reifying judicial discretion and relying upon the doctrine of
precedent to protect Community citizens' fundamental rights.
It reflects a continental or civil law bias toward text, a prefer-
7. Single European Act, supra note 3, preamble, O.J. L 169/1, at 1; see Draft
Treaty, supra note 4, OJ. C 77/33, at 36-37, art. 4(3). One author suggests that
inclusion of reference to the Convention in the Preamble of the Single European Act
prompted the Court of Justice of the European Communities to refer to it "as a
source of law in terms which differ slightly but significantly from those of a compara-
ble dictum a year earlier." Edward, Constitutional Rules of Community Law in EEC Com-
petition Cases, 13 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 111, 119-20 n.45 (1989-1990), 1989 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 383 (B. Hawk ed. 1990) (citing UNECTEF (Union of Football Train-
ers) v. Heylens & Ors., Case 222/86, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, 4117, 14, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1989] 1 CEC 131;Johnston v. Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constab-
ulary, Case 222/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, 1682, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,304, at 16,887).-
8. The European Parliament "[c]ondemns the inadequacy of the Social Charter
adopted by the Council." See Resolution of December 14, 1989 on the European
Council in Strasbourg and the French Presidency's Six Months in Office, O.J. C 15/
315, 316 (1990); see also Texts adopted by the European Parliament: Community
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights-Social and economic cohesion, OJ. C 323/
44 (1989); Resolution adopting the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms, O.J. C 120/51 (1989). For a critique of the latter resolution, which is limited
to rights concerning working conditions (article 13) and social assistance (articles 2,
15), see Editorial Comments, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 589 (1989).
9. Community Charter, supra note 2, preamble.
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ence for codification rather than judicial pronouncement of ba-
sic rights, and a partial remedy for what has come to be known
as the European Community's "democratic deficit."'"
On a pragmatic level, the Community Charter endorses
such controversial concepts as "codetermination," a worker/
management participation plan that seems to reinvigorate the
controversial Vredling proposal" and its progeny, albeit with-
out mechanisms for enforcement. As will be discussed below,
the Community Charter arguably invites affirmative action for
women by providing that "[e]qual opportunities for men and
women must be developed."' 2 Many of the rights enumerated
are already the subject of existing provisions of the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Economic Community (the "EEC
Treaty"), decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (the "Court of Justice" or the "Court"), and
Community legislation; nonetheless, the Community Charter
could eventually provide clearer constitutional status and po-
tentially affect issues such as standing, and perhaps level of
scrutiny, should this doctrine ever emerge in the Community's
constitutional jurisprudence. Though such an outcome is cer-
tainly not preordained, especially because the final draft as-
cribes the ambiguous character of "declaration" to the Com-
munity Charter, this catalogue conceivably could be directly in-
voked by Community citizens as part of their bill of rights.'"
This result might be more likely if the Community Charter is
10. See Internationale Handelsgessellschaft, Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BVerfGE 271,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 [hereinafter Solange I] (discussing term "democratic deficit");
see also Edward, supra note 7, at 113 (comparing Bill of Rights' role in U.S. constitu-
tional law with lack of such catalogue in EC); Editorial Comments: Judicial harmonisation,
25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 5 (1988); Mendelson, The European Court ofJustice and Human
Rights, 1981 Y.B. EUR. L. 125 (F.Jacobs ed. 1982). For a discussion ofjudicial expan-
sion of individual standing to challenge acts of Community organs, see Roberts,Judi-
cial Review of Legislative Measures: The European Court oflustice Breathes Life into the Second
Paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome, 26 COLUM. J. TRANs. L. 245 (1988).
11. Proposal for a Directive on procedures for informing and consulting the em-
ployees of undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational under-
takings, OJ. C 297/3 (1980), as amended, OJ. C 217/3 (1983); see Single European
Act, supra note 3, art. 22, OJ. L 169/1, at 9 (supplementing EEC Treaty Article 118
with 118B).
12. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 16; see infra notes 96-97 and accompa-
nying text (discussing equal rights requirement for men and women).
13. The Parliament regretted "that the Charter has not been embodied in Com-
munity law by means of binding instruments." Doc. A 3-69/89, 2, O.J. C 323/44,
at 45 (1989).
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accompanied by formal accession to the European Convention
on Human Rights, thus encompassing civil and political as well
as economic and social "rights" in the Community's written
catalogue.
This Article considers the Commission's initial step to-
ward a Community bill of rights-its 1979 proposal for acces-
sion to the European Convention. 4 That proposal was
prompted in large measure by a 1974 decision of the German
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which
was overturned by a 1986 ruling dubbed, in memory of its
predecessor, Solange II (literally, "So long as . . .,,). I Due to
the importance of these Solange rulings for Community human
rights jurisprudence, their significance and substance are ex-
amined in some detail in Part II of the Article. In Part III, the
Council of Europe's European Social Charter is contrasted
with the Community Charter, the former document having
been signed, though not ratified, by all twelve Community
Member States. This Article concludes with a plea that the
Community, in observing the Community Charter, should ac-
cede to the European Convention on Human Rights.
I. THE FIRST STEP. THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR
ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
In April 1979, the Commission submitted a far-reaching
proposal to the Council of Ministers, formally recommending
that the Community accede to the European Convention on
Human Rights.' 6 Its effort was in large part prompted by the
1974 Solange I decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which
held that "so long as" there existed neither a viable legislative
power sufficient to balance the other Community organs nor a
written catalogue of fundamental rights, the German Basic
14. Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human
Rights-Commission Memorandum, E.C. BULL., Supp. 2/79, adopted April 4, 1979
[hereinafter Memorandum]; see E.C. BULL. No. 4, at 16 (1979).
15. Re Winsche Handelsgessellschaft, Case 2 BvR 197/83, 73 BVerfGE 339,
[1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225 [hereinafter Solange II]; see Frowein, Note, Solange II (BVerfGE
73, 339). Constitutional Complaint Firma W., 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 201 (1988);
Judgment of April 10, 1987, Case 2 BvR 1236/86, 1987 EUROPA RECHT 269, as cited in
PJ.G. KAPTEYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 352 n.408 (2d Eng. ed. L. Gormley ed. 1989).
16. Memorandum, supra note 14, at 8, 6.
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Law would be considered superior to Community law. 7 A less
flagrant but similarly assertive judgment of the Italian Corte
Costituzionale that same year also contributed to this "consti-
tutional crisis."' 8 Demands for an unambiguous enumeration
of guaranteed rights that could be invoked against Community
institutions subsequently grew, especially in the European Par-
liament. 19
The German Constitutional Court's reference to the lack
of a viable legislative power was termed the "democratic defi-
cit."120 The situation was improved by the direct election of
Parliament's members in 1979, but that body's substantive
powers remained exceedingly weak in comparison with those
of the Commission and the Council or with those of Member
States' parliaments.
Universal suffrage was preceded by a 1977 Joint Declara-
tion of the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission on
Fundamental Rights. 2' That instrument underlined the pri-
17. Solange I, Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540. This
decision prompted a special report of the Commission of February 4, 1976 to the
European Parliament and the Council on "The Protection of Fundamental Rights as
Community Law Is Created and Developed." Protection of Fundamental Rights
within the European Community, E.C. BULL., Supp. 5/76. The report includes a
study by R. Bernhardt on "The Problems of Drawing Up a Catalogue of Fundamental
Rights for the European Community." See Weber, The Supranationality Problem, in
RiGHTs, INSTITUTIONS AND THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO THE
GERMAN BASIC LAW 223, 233 (C. Starck ed. 1987). The Court ofJustice had explicitly
rejected such a holding in Internationale Handelsgessellschaft v. Einfuhr-und
Voratsstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126.
18. Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, Giust. civ. 1974-IlI, Case 183/73, at 410,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372; see Petriccione, Supremacy of Community Law over National
Law, 11 EUR. L. REV. 320 (1986), cited in P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT, supra
note 15, at 353 n.410.
19. See Resolution of April 27, 1979, O.J. C 127/69 (1979) (Scelba Report); Res-
olution of Oct. 29, 1982, O.J. C 304/253 (Gonnella Report); Resolution embodying
the opinion of the European Parliament on the memorandum from the Commission
of European Communities on the accession of the European Communities to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, O.J. C
304/253 (1982). The question has continued to be raised within the Parliament,
mainly by the Institutional Affairs Committee and the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Civil Rights. See OJ. Annex No. 2-337, D~bats du Parlement europ~en, Compte
rendu des seances du 11 au mars 1986, at 99-103, 105-11 (then acting President, EC
Council of Ministers, Van den Broek (Neth.), participating).
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing "democratic deficit").
21. Declaration of April 5, 1977, O.J. C 103/1 (1977) [hereinafter Joint Declara-
tion]; see Bermann, supra note 3, at 575.
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mary importance of rights reflected both in Member States'
constitutions and in the European Convention on Human
Rights. It also affirmed the Court ofJustice's gradual incorpo-
ration of the European Convention on Human Rights into its
own jurisprudence and pledged Member States' efforts to con-
tinue to safeguard fundamental rights. 2 It did not proclaim
the need for a written bill of rights, however, and neither the
Parliament nor the Commission thought the measures taken
were sufficient to cure the German Court's complaint.
Without repeating the wealth of literature that the Com-
mission's proposal generated when it was first promulgated,23
its main points are worth noting. First, the Commission estab-
lished that the European Convention on Human Rights,
designed to protect traditional civil and political rights, is in-
deed applicable to the European Community. This was no
easy task, given the skepticism of many legal pragmatists to-
ward hortatory proclamations of rights. By a review of case law
and a projection of situations that would confront the Commu-
nity institutions in relations with both Community and non-
Community actors, the Commission demonstrated that classic
rights such as free expression, due process, and equal protec-
tion are implicated by Community actions. The Community
was not affected only by traditional economic and social rights
included in the EC Treaties.
The main problems envisaged by the Commission were
technical in nature. A primary concern was Community repre-
22. Joint Declaration, supra note 21; see Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case
29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8077; Internationale Handel-
sgesellschaft v. Einfuhr, Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8126 (1971); Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491; Rutili v. Minister for
the Interior, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322.
23. See, e.g., Minch & Paulin, The European Community and the European Convention
on Human Rights, 15 Gvr. & OpPosITIoN 31 (1979); Economides & Weiler, Reports of
Committees, 42 MOD. L. REV. 683 (1979); Ehlermann, Accession of the European Community
to the European Convention on Human Rights, in Do WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS? 114 (C.
Campbell ed. 1981); Brown & McBride, Observations on the Proposed Accession by the Euro-
pean Community to the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 AM. J. CoMp. L. 691
(1981); Sperduti, Comment concevoir, dans sa sp/cificite 1'adhsion des Communautis europien-
nes d la Convention de Rome sur la sauvegarde des Droits de 1'Homme et des libertis fonda-
mentales, in VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHTSORDNUNG: INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT
MENSCHENRECHTE, FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERMANN MOSLER 903 (R. Bernhardt, W. Geck,
G. Jaenicke & H. Steinberger eds. 1983). For a bibliography of leading works on this
topic, see A. BLECKMANN, DIE BINDNUNG DER EUROPXISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT AN DIE
EUROPAISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION 2-3 n.7 (1986).
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sentation in the Council of Europe organs, particularly the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights and the Commission of
Human Rights.2 4  Some feared that as the Community ex-
panded, the influence of those belonging to both the Commu-
nity and the Council of Europe would increase to the detri-
ment of non-Community members. Others raised objections
to a superior specialized human rights court, including some
involved in a series of exchanges or "study missions" between
the Court ofJustice and the European Court of Human Rights,
an effort coordinated by the Council of Europe's Human
Rights Directorate.
The Commission's conclusion was that accession, as a pre-
liminary step to creation of the Community's own catalogue of
rights, is legally possible. While the technical problems are
generally agreed to be surmountable, however, the stumbling
block would prove to be a lack of political will on the part of
Member States, particularly the United Kingdom.2 5  Having
done well for centuries without a written constitution and bill
of rights, the United Kingdom favors the customary creation of
rights protections--on a case-by-case basis through the courts.
Its most cogent argument against accession is that sufficient
protection already exists in the EC Treaties themselves, the
1978 European Declaration on Democracy and its follow-up
1986 Declaration on Human Rights, 26 the 1977 Joint Declara-
24. For a discussion of the mechanics of Community accession to the Conven-
tion, see Memorandum, supra note 14, 30-34 & 43-46; Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, Doc. 4649, Report on Accession of the European Communi-
ties to the Convention on Human Rights (M.M. Blenk & Krieps) (Dec. 11, 1980).
25. The United Kingdom fears, with good reason, direct applicability of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights through the back door of Community legisla-
tion. Under U.K. law, the European Convention on Human Rights is a treaty without
binding domestic effect. The rights it conveys on U.K. citizens can be raised in U.K.
courts but can only be adjudicated in Strasbourg. The British also led the opposition
to the European Social Charter.
26. See E.C. BULL. No. 5 (July 21, 1986); E.C. BULL. No. 3, at 5-6 (April 8, 1978).
The latter Declaration was promulgated at the time of impending enlargement of the
Community by Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and reflected concern with their rela-
tively recent returns to democracy from dictatorship. The European Parliament ex-
pressed similar sentiment in its Resolution on the prospects of enlargement of the
Community, O.J. C 39/47, at 48 (1979). Parliament demanded that failure to respect
civil and political rights and pluralist traditions embodied in Member States' constitu-
tions and international instruments to which they are signatories, as "established by
the Court ofJustice, should constitute incompatibility with membership of the Com-
munity." See Ehlermann, supra note 23, at 118.
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tion,27 secondary Community legislation, and, most impor-
tantly, the jurisprudence of the Court ofJustice. 8 In rejecting
the Commission's proposal for accession, the House of Lords
Select Committee on the European Communities did not ex-
clude the possibility of accession sometime in the future.
Rather, the Select Committee admonished that the Council of
Europe's human rights machinery needed attention, an indi-
rect rebuke to France's failure to accept the right of individual
petition.29
Why was accession recommended by the Commission only
as a step intermediate to a custom-made catalogue? In its
words: "If [such a separate catalogue] were undertaken too
hastily, there is the fear that it would bring to light differences
between the Member States, particularly with regard to eco-
nomic and social rights, and that agreement would be possible
only on the basis of the lowest common denominator."" ° The
Commission noted that efforts to expand the European Con-
vention on Human Rights to include economic and social
rights had not met "striking success."' t A Council of Europe
Committee of Experts for the Extension of the Rights Estab-
lished in the European Convention has been considering the
question since 1978, a follow-up measure to the Council of Eu-
rope's own Declaration on Human Rights of April 27, 1978.2
In this forum, the Federal Republic of Germany has joined
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in opposing
proposals to include economic and social rights. Nonetheless,
rights tentatively agreed upon for inclusion are: adequate
compensation in the event of expropriation; equal pay for
equal work for men and women; equal treatment with respect
to employment and occupation for men and women; social and
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Joint Declaration).
28. See, -e.g., Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3727,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629 (holding European Convention on Human Rights
to be part of Community's constitutional order); Rutili v. Minister for the Interior,
Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322 (relying upon
Convention as source of inspiration, not as binding catalogue).
29. See House of Lords Report of the Select Committee on the European Com-
munities, Session 1979-80, 71st Report No. 362, at xvi-xvii; infra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text (discussing French acceptance of'right to petition).
30. Memorandum, supra note 14, at 8, 5.
31. Id. at n.l.
32. See Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 838, of September 27, 1978;
Official Report of Debates, Parliamentary Assembly, 30th Sess., vol. II, at 311.
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medical assistance; and compulsory education. 33
In fact, "haste" was much less the problem for creating a
Community bill of rights than traditional opposition from
Member States that have viewed economic and social rights as
programmatic, more aspirational than constitutional in nature.
Coordination of Member States' social legislation could be fa-
cilitated by the Commission, and in some cases by the Council
of Europe, but implementation of social rights is considered
better left to each individual Member State's discretion. 4
Even under the Single European Act, Article 118A of the EEC
Treaty calls for harmonization of Member State measures to
protect workers' health and safety by means of directives set-
ting "minimum requirements for gradual implementation, hav-
ing regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in
each of the Member States," '35 hardly a revolutionary advance
with respect to the Community's social policy. (At the same
time, Article 118A is a clear recognition of federal compe-
tence.) An even weaker Article 118B merely obliges the Com-
mission to "endeavor to develop the dialogue between man-
agement and labour at [the] European level which could, if the
two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on
agreement, '3 6 a ratification of the status quo.
As efforts to expand the European Convention on Human
Rights to include economic and social rights and the Commu-
nity's own jurisprudence demonstrate, the dividing line be-
tween rights of a "civil and political" and "social and eco-
33. See Jacobs, The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to Include
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3 HUMAN RIGHTs REV. 166 (1978).
34. The European Social Charter requires State Parties to make periodic imple-
mentation reports to a committee of independent experts appointed by the Council
of Europe. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, arts. 21-24. This mechanism
for monitoring compliance is similar to those established by the UN Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 9, arts. 16-17; Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 181-82, art. 40; see also infra notes 90-142 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing European Social Charter).
The United States has been even more loathe to proclaim "federal" economic
and social rights. See Henkin, Economic and Social Rights as "Rights ": A United States
Perspective, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 223 (1981).
35. Single European Act, supra note 3, art. 21, OJ. L 169/1, at 9 (amending EEC
Treaty Art. 118).
36. Id. art. 22.
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nomic" nature can often be blurred. The rights to property"7
and education3 8 guaranteed in the First Protocol to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights have been invoked before
the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Provisions of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights that safeguard the rights
to respect for private life, home and correspondence, 39 and
freedom of expression 40 affect EC rules on competition and
prices as well as free movement of goods and persons within
the Community. Similarly, increasing instances of business
and tax fraud, while largely within the criminal enforcement
realm of the Member States, also have Community law implica-
tions. Fundamental prohibitions of ne bis in idem (double jeop-
ardy) and nulla poena sine lege4 arise in such cases, 42 as do ques-
tions of procedural due process, privilege, and confidential-
ity. 4
There are several clear examples of the applicability of
37. For a discussion of the right to property, see Solange H, Case 2 BvR 197/33,
73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225, 39 (citing Nold v. Commission, Case 4/
73, 1974 E.C.R. 491; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3727,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629; Agricola Commerciale Olio v. Commission, Case
232/81, 1984 E.C.R. 3881, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,148; SAVMA v. Commis-
sion, Case 264/81, 1984 E.C.R. 3915, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,149).
38. See Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt MiInchen, Case 9/74, 1974 E.C.R. 773,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8280; Alaimo v. Pr6fet du Rhone, Case 68/74, 1975
E.C.R. 109, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8301; Gravier v. City of Liege, Case 293/
83, 1985 E.C.R. 593, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,152; Blaizot v. University of
Liege, Case 24/86, 1988 E.C.R. 379, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1989] 1 CEC 392;
Barra v. Belgian State and City of Liege, Case 309/85, 1988 E.C.R. 355, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1989] 2 CEC 461; Lair v. Universitit Hannover, Case 39/86, 1988
E.C.R. 3161, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 1 CEC 106 (all discussing right to
education).
39. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 8(1).
40. Id. art. 10(1).
41. Id. art. 7.
42. See generally Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, Case 7/72, 1972
E.C.R. 1281, 1289-90, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8191; Racke v. Hauptzollamt
Mainz, Case 98/78, 1979 E.C.R. 69, 85-87, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8541; Re-
gina v. Kirk, Case 63/83, 1984 E.C.R. 2689, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,070.
43. See, e.g., Edward, supra note 7, at 123-37; Christoforou, Protection of Legal Priv-
ilege in EEC Competition Law: The Imperfections of a Case, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 39
n. 114, 39-41 & 48 (1985-1986); Harding, The European Communities and Control of Crim-
inal Business Activities, 31 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 246 (1982); Kuyper & van Rijn, Proce-
dural Guarantees and Investigatory Methods in European Law, with Special Reference to Compe-
tition, in [1982] 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 1 (F. Jacobs ed. 1983). For a view of the non-applica-
bility of criminal law to the Community, see Statement by Chairman Lord Fraser,
House of Lords Report of the Select Committee on the European Communitites,
Session 1979-80, 71st Report No. 362, at 2, 3.
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civil and political rights to acts of Community institutions.
Community personnel have relied upon both article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, prohibiting restric-
tions on freedom of religion, 4 and on article 11, guaranteeing
freedom of association. 4' The Convention's provisions even
affect Community citizens who do not have contractual rela-
tions with the institutions. In one case demonstrating the lacu-
nae in fundamental rights protection, a French labor organiza-
tion, Confederation Fran~aise De'mocratique du Travail, filed a
petition with the European Commission on Human Rights
against the European Community and, alternatively, their
Member States, jointly and severally.46 The organization
claimed violations of European Convention on Human Rights
articles 11 (freedom of association), 13 (right to an effective
remedy for violations), and 14 (prohibition of discrimina-
tion).' 7 Undisputed was the fact that the case involved the
trade's second largest labor organization, exclusion thus being
a prima facie case of discrimination.48
A petition before the French Conseil d'Etat had been re-
jected for want of jurisdiction over the EC Council;4 9 a com-
plaint filed in Luxembourg was declared inadmissible by the
Court of Justice on grounds that only a Member State or the
EC Commission is entitled under article 38 of the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Coal and Steel Community (the
"ECSC Treaty") to set aside a decision of the Council.5 The
European Commission on Human Rights also dismissed the
complaint on jurisdictional grounds because the Community is
44. See Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1589.
45. See Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322.
46. Application No. 8030/77, Eur. Commission of Human Rights, Decision of
July 10, 1978, 13 EUR. CoM. H. RTs. DEC. & REPS. 231, 21 Y.B. EUR. CONV. H.R. 530
(1978); see 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 498 (1979).
47. 13 EUR. COM. H. RTS. DEC. & REPS. 231 (1978); see Alkema, Comment: The EC
and the European Convention of Human Rights-Immunity and Impunity for the Community?,
16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 501 (1979); European Parliament Written Question 911/
77 (Patijn), OJ. C 60/1 (1977).
48. See Alkema, supra note 47.
49. Judgment of Feb. 10, 1978, Case 05.225, [1978] Recueil des dcisions du
Conseil d'Etat 61.
50. Confed6ration Franqaise D~mocratique du Travail v. Council, Case 66/76,
1977 E.C.R. 305.
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not party to the European Convention (article 66) 5  and
France had not accepted the right of the individual to petition
the European Commission on Human Rights under European
Convention on Human Rights article 25.52 The European
Commission on Human Rights also said that the other Com-
munity Member States, which were also Contracting Parties to
the European Convention, had not exercised their "jurisdic-
tion" within the meaning of article 1 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights; merely taking part in Council decision-
making was not sufficient.53
The EC Council remedied the obvious wrong by ap-
pointing a member of Confederation Frangaise D~mocratique
du Travail to the ECSC Consultative Committee in 1978. 54
This case established, however, that the Community's liability
for an alleged violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights lies within the jurisdictional discretion of the
Court in Luxembourg. Whether the European Commission on
Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights would
hear such a case today, perhaps rendering the earlier decision
an anomaly rather than precedent, is an open question now
that France has granted the right of individual petition to its
citizens. 55 The logic of excluding the Community, together
with the European Commission on Human Rights' refusal to
hold the Member States liable either individually or collec-
tively, would likely lead it in a subsequent case to a no compe-
tence ruling similar to that of the Conseil d'Etat.56
51. See Application No. 8030/77, European Commission of Human Rights, De-
cision ofJuly 10, 1978, 13 EUR. CoM. H. RTS. DEC. & REPS. 231, 21 Y.B. EUR. CONv.
H.R. 530 (1978); 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 498 (1979), 3.
52. See id. 6.
53. Id. 7.
54. Council Decision of Oct. 16, 1978, OJ. L 314/5 (1978).
55. France adhered to article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights
granting individuals the right to petition the European Commission on Human
Rights on October 2, 1981. Council of Europe, "Discours de M. Andre Chanderna-
gor, Ministre D61gue aupre du Ministre des Relations Ext~rieures de France,"
D(81)10, E 49.838.
56. In his comment on the Commission's decision in Application No. 8030/77,
Mr. Alkema suggests that the EC Council of Ministers could ask the Council of Eu-
rope's Committee of Ministers to request an advisory opinion from the Court under
the Second Protocol to the European Convention. Alkema, supra note 47, at 507-08.
He also argues that since the original six Community Member States were already
party at that time to the European Convention on Human Rights, article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
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Efforts by both the Commission and the. Parliament to
move forward have been thwarted by various Member States in
the Council of Ministers, including France, Denmark, and the
United Kingdom. The 1986 European Council Declaration on
Human Rights'5 7 omission of any reference to accession, com-
bined with futile efforts to have the issue raised in the Commit-
tee of Permanent Representatives, 58 have led many to the con-
clusion that accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights, with or without extension to social and economic
rights, is a dead letter.5 9 The requisite political will seems to
be lacking,60 despite continued pressure by the Parliament 6'
and interest by Commission President Jacques Delors.
U.N.T.S. 331, obliges them to refrain from acts inconsistent with the object and pur-
pose of the prior obligation, here, to avoid redress of a Convention violation. He
warns that the European Commission on Human Rights by this decision excludes
consideration of acts of other regional bodies such as the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA), BENELUX, and the Nordic Council. Alkema, supra note 47, at 503-
04; see BLECKMANN, supra note 23, at 79 (comparing Community incorporation of
GATT and European Convention on Human Rights).
57. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Declaration on Human
Rights).
58. See Com. ESC (86)605, April 14, 1986. COREPER is the acronym for the
Council of Ministers Committee of Permanent Representatives- meeting in perma-
nent session in Brussels. COREPER functions on two levels: the Permanent Repre-
sentatives meeting to discuss and resolve policy issues on behalf of the Member
States whom they represent as ambassadors; and delegated representatives, Member
State officials with functional or technical expertise, dealing with more "routine mat-
ters." See PJ.G. KAPrEYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT, supra note 15, at 257-59. The Council
of Ministers, as COREPER, is chaired on a six-month rotating basis by the Member
States' Permanent Representatives.
59. In April 1986, then President of the Council, Ambassador Van den Broek,
was reported to have said that "he would assess whether or not it was feasible once
again to put this business on the next Council's agenda or whether it should be con-
sidered as well and truly buried." Agence Europe, April 23, 1986, at 9.
60. At its meeting of October 13-14, 1986, the Committee on Institutional Af-
fairs of the European Parliament considered a report by Mr. De Gucht (Belgium) on
establishing a list of fundamental rights for European citizens. The report rejected
the notion that accession to the European Convention on Human Rights could ade-
quately protect individuals. See Report of the Council of Europe's Colombo Commis-
sion, CE Doc. 4.660, June 1985. The report was compiled by a group of eminent
Europeans convened under Recommendation 994 of the Council of Europe Parlia-
mentary Assembly (October 3, 1984) to establish "perspective for European co-oper-
ation beyond the present decade." See id. at 7, pt. d. In an Appendix to the Report,
the Secretariat reiterated its support for accession by the Community to the Euro-
pean Convention. Id. at 11, 23. Furthermore, it concluded that
[t]he fact that a future European Union might adopt a catalogue of human
rights is no obstacle to accession to the [European] Convention by the Com-
munity, any more than the catalogues that the States Parties to the [Euro-
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II. SOLANGE II
In the civil law-dominated European Community, it is sur-
prising the extent to which Member States have accepted judi-
cial precedent as sufficient guarantee of fundamental rights. In
1986, the Bundesverfassungsgericht abandoned its earlier in-
sistence on a written bill of rights in Solange II, a landmark case
both for the German legal system as well as for the Commu-
nity.62 Not only did the case resolve the supremacy issue in the
Community's favor, but it also rendered its own common law
catalogue of judicial precedents.
The facts of Solange I were quite mundane-German au-
thorities denied an application for the importation of pre-
served mushrooms from non-EC Member States, a decision
upheld by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the German High
Administrative Court, after an EEC Article 177 referral to the
European Court in Luxembourg.6 3 The substantive issue was
as follows: when Community law is deemed to be in conflict
with German Basic Law protecting fundamental rights, which
law is supreme?
Several external developments affected the German
Court's 1974 Solange I ruling. Community-wide protection of
human rights had improved when France belatedly ratified the
European Convention on Human Rights in 1974, and when it
recognized individuals' rights to petition the Human Rights
pean] Convention embody in their systems of domestic law prevent those
states from acceding to the [European] Convention.
Id. 24; see supra note 24 (discussing Community accession).
61. See European Parliament Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,
O.J. C 120/52 (1989).
62. See Solange H1, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225.
In a decision of July 25, 1979, the German Court had rendered a ruling in Fa.
Steinike und Weinlig v. Bundesamt ftir Ernihrung und Forstwirtschaft, Case 2 BvL
6/77, 52 BVerfGE 187, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 531, commonly referred to as the "Veil-
leicht" or "perhaps" decision. In partial retreat from its 1974 posture in Solange I, it
"expressly left open the question whether or to what extent (having regard to the
political and legal developments which might take place in the meantime in the Euro-
pean Community matters) the principles laid down in the judgment of 29 May 1974"
would prevail. Solange 1H, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 258-59, 34; see Hilf, Solange 1I: wie
lange nach Solange?, 14 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHT ZEITSCHRIFr [EuGRZ] 1 (1987);
Herdegen, Europiisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und die Bindung deutscher Verfassungsorgane an
das Grundgesetz, 16 EuGRZ 309-14 (1989).
63. Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, Case 126/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1479,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8830.
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Commission in Strasbourg in 1981.64 Moreover, the 1979 di-
rect election of the European Parliament was a step toward
making the Community's institutional structure more demo-
cratic, even if Parliament's powers were not significantly in-
creased. 65
While the "democratic deficit" and the incomplete partici-
pation of EC Member States in the European Convention on
Human Rights system were significant, what the German Con-
stitutional Court found to be most important were decisions of
the Court of Justice.66 It side-stepped the Court of Justice's
1970 ruling in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft67 that Commu-
nity law "[could] not be affected by an allegation that it runs
counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the con-
stitution of [a Member] State or the principles of a national
constitutional structure."6 8 Instead it found that the Court of
Justice
would still have to consider however whether an analogous
guarantee under Community law had been disregarded, for
the safeguarding of fundamental rights formed part of the
general principles of law which the Court had to protect.
Whilst the protection of such rights must be supported by
the constitutional traditions of the member States they must
also operate within the structure and objectives of the Com-
69
munity.
Citing the 1974 case of Nold v. Commission,"° the German Con-
64. See supra note 55 (discussing French adherence to article 25 of European
Convention on Human Rights).
65. See REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, presented by the Committee of
Three to the European Council, Doc. 1-33/80, Oct. 1979 (1980) (B. Biesheuvel, E.
Dell & R. Marjolin), referred to as the Report of the Three Wise Men, at 57-62. See
Dominick, La procidure de decision dans la Communauti et le nouveau riglement intrieur du
Parlement europien, 248 REVUE DU MARCHt COMMUN 274 (1981) (discussing Parlia-
ment's attempts to enhance powers after direct election). For later efforts, see Ber-
mann, supra note 3, at 575-83; Bieber, Pantalis, & Schoo, Implications of the Single Actfor
the European Parliament, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 767 (1986) (discussing enhance-
ment under Single European Act).
66. See Solange II, Case'2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at
259, 36(aa).
67. Case 11/70, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8126
(1971).
68. Solange 11, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 259,
37.
69. Id.
70. Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491.
COMMUNITY BILL OF RIGHTS
stitutional Court described the outer parameters of the Court
ofJustice's powers in safeguarding fundamental rights as "the
common constitutional traditions of the member States," a
limit which prohibits all measures "incompatible with funda-
mental rights recognised and guaranteed by the constitutions
of those States."17' The logical result is that, according to Ger-
man law, the catalogue of fundamental rights found in the Ger-
man Basic Law and the European Convention on Human
Rights is binding on the Court of Justice.
Relying upon these general principles of Community law,
the next ten years saw the recognition of specific rights by the
Court, many of which have already been described in the pre-
ceding discussion of the Commission's Memorandum:
Side by side with the express guarantees of liberties con-
tained in Community Treaties themselves72 the foreground
was occupied naturally by fundamental rights and freedoms
relating to economic activities.73 . . . In addition . .. [the
European Court] cited other basic rights, such as freedom
of association, the general principle of equal treatment and
the prohibition on arbitrary acts, religious freedom or the
protection of the family, as standards of assessment. 4
Reflecting the important distinction drawn between fundamen-
tal rights and general principles of law, the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht identified additional principles that follow
71. Solange H, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at, 260,
38.
72. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 7, 48-73 [footnote adapted from n.44 in
original].
73. See Nold v. Commission; Case 4/73, 1974 E.C.R. 491; Hauer v. Land Rhein-
land-Pfalz, Case 44/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629; Agric-
ola Commerciale Olio v. Commission, Case 232/81, 1984 E.C.R. 3881, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,148; SAVMA v. Commissioner, Case 264/81, 1984 E.C.R.
3915, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,149 [footnote adapted from n.45 in original].
74. See Union Syndicale, Massa and Kortner v. Council, Case 175/73, 1974
E.C.R. 917; Ruckdeschel & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, Cases 117/76
and 16/77, 1977 E.C.R. 1753, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8457; Biovilac v. EEC,
Case 59/83, 1984 E.C.R. 4057, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,150; Finsider v.
Commission, Case 250/83, 1985 E.C.R. 142; Kupferberg II v. Hauptzollamt Mainz,
Case 253/83, 1985 E.C.R. 166; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,175; Samara v. Com-
mission, Case 266/83, 1985 E.C.R. 196; Michel v. Commission, Case 273/83, 1985
E.C.R. 354; Defrenne III v. SABENA, Case 149/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8500; Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1589; Diatta v. Land
Berlin, Case 267/83, 1985 E.C.R. 567, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,169 [footnote
adapted from n.46 in original].
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from the rule of law: prohibition of excessive action; propor-
tionality;75 prohibition of ex post facto laws resulting from the
principle of legal certainty; 76 prohibition of double penalties; 77
and the obligation to state reasons for individual decisions. 78
The right to effective judicial protection for the safeguard of
rights79 and the duty to grant a legal hearing were also cited as
"essential requirement[s] of a fair procedural system."80
These due process guarantees developed on a case-by-
case basis. Judicial precedents and the Court of Justice's refer-
ences to the European Convention on Human Rights and its
additional protocols,8 ' however, were not the only sources of
the German Court's common law catalogue. Like the Commis-
sion in its 1979 proposal of accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 1986
highlighted both the April 5, 1977 Joint Declaration of the Eu-
75. See Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at
260-61, 40; see also Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37
BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79,
1979 E.C.R. 3727, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8629; Testa v. Bundesanstah fir
Arbeit, Cases 41, 121, and 796/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1979, 1997; National Panasonic v.
Commission, Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2059, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8682; Public Prosecutor v. Heijn, Case 94/83, 1984 E.C.R. 3263, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,120; Fearon v. Irish Land Commission, Case 182/83, 1984 E.C.R. 3677,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,126; Public Prosecutor v. ADBHU, Case 240/83,
1985 E.C.R. 538, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164; M. Hilf, 1985 EuGRZ 647,
649.
76. See Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225.
77. See id.; see also Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission, Case 7/72,
1972 E.C.R. 1281, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8191; Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz,
Case 98/78, 1979 E.C.R. 69, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8541; Regina v. Kirk, Case
63/83, 1984 E.C.R. 2689, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,070.
78. See Solange H, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225;
see also Intermills v. Commission, Case 323/82, 1984 E.C.R. 3809, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,154; Netherlands v. Commission, Cases 296 & 318/82, 1985 E.C.R.
809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,170; M. Hilf, supra note 75, at 650.
79. See Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225;
see also Johnston, supra note 7, at 17, 18 (citing constitutional traditions of Member
States and European Convention on Human Rights article 13).
80. See Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, 3 C.M.L.R. 225; see also
Pecastaing v. Belgian State, Case 98/79, 1980 E.C.R. 691, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8654; National Panasonic v. Commission, Case 136/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2058,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8682.
81. See Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at
261, 41; see also Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1219,
1232, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322; Johnston v. Chief Constable of Royal
Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,304.
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ropean Parliament, Council, and Commission, 82 and the Euro-
pean Council's April 1978 Declaration on Democracy.85 It
concluded that while the "case-by-case" or common law
method of protecting human rights resulted in "gaps,"
[wihat is decisive nevertheless is the attitude of principle
which the Court maintains at this stage towards the Com-
munity's obligations in respect of fundamental rights, to the
incorporation of fundamental rights in Community law
under legal rules and the legal connection of that law (to
that extent) with the constitutions of Member-States and
with the European [Human Rights] Convention, as is also
the practical significance which has been achieved by the
protection of fundamental rights in the meantime in the
Court's application of Community law. 84
The German Constitutional Court, in essence, retracted
its earlier insistence on a codified catalogue of fundamental
rights and a parliament empowered to enact legislation.8 5 The
guarantees developed by the Court of Justice are now, in its
opinion, "substantially similar to the unconditional protection
of fundamental rights under the [German] Constitution." 86
That the Community is not party to the European Convention
on Human Rights87 and that the "catalogue" derives from
common law rather than codification are deemed inconsequen-
tial.
Reminiscent of the Italian Constitutional Court's decision
in Frontini,88 the Bundesverfassungsgericht reserved its right to
subordinate Community law to fundamental rights guaranteed
82. See Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at
261, 42; supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Joint Declaration).
83. Solange H, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 262,
43; supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing 1978 Declaration).
84. Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 262,
44(e).
85. See id. at 258, 33[c]; id. at 263, 45.
86. Id. at 262, 44(e).
87. See id. at 264, 46.
88. See Giust. civ. 1974-1I1, Case 183/73, at 410; [1974] C.M.L.R. 372; A. MAN-
GAS MARTIN, DERECHO COMMUNITARIO EUROPEO Y DERECHO ESPANOL 140 (1986), as
reviewed by Hofmann, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 930, 931-32 (1986); Santaolalla
Gadea & Martinez Lage, Spanish Accession to the European Communities: Legal and Consti-
tutional Implications, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11, 14 (1986) (discussing Spanish Con-
stitution's potential incompatability with Community law in field of Community
rights).
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in the German Basic Law only if the level of protection in the
Community should falter.
[So] long as the European Communities, and in particular
the case law of the European Court, generally ensure an ef-
fective protection of fundamental rights as against the sov-
ereign power of the Communities which is to be regarded as
substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights
required unconditionally by the Constitution, and in so far
as they generally safeguard the essential content of funda-
mental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no
longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability
of secondary Community legislation cited as the legal basis
for any acts of German courts or authorities within the sov-
ereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and
it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of
fundamental rights contained in the Constitution . . .89
In other words, "so long as" the protection of fundamental
rights within the Community by the Court of Justice remains
"substantially similar" to that which would be afforded by Ger-
man courts, i.e., the Court of Justice is itself enforcing the
rights guaranteed in the German Basic Law and in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights to which Germany is a
party, then the Bundesverfassungsgericht will no longer exer-
cise jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of Commu-
nity legislation. Both the European Convention on Human
Rights and, by logical extension, the European Social Charter,
are incorporated by common law.
III. THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL C-ARTER
Though less frequently cited than the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights as part of the Community's unwritten
catalogue of rights, the European Social Charter is another
source of human rights protection and a subject for Commu-
nity accession. 90 In some cases stronger but often weaker than
89. Solange II, Case 2 BvR 197/33, 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 265,
48(f). There is some speculation in the Federal Republic of Germany that two recent
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights may give rise to a "Solange III"
decision. See Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, Judg. No. 14/1988/158/214 of March
28, 1990; Autronic AG v. Switzerland, Judg. No. 15/1989/175/231 of May 22, 1990.
90. See Defrenne III v. SABENA, Case 149/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 1378, 26-
29, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8500 (concerning equal employment conditions for
men and women). Recognizing its duty to respect fundamental personal human
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the European Convention on Human Rights in the specificity
of its provisions, it is also the instrument which most closely
resembles the Commission's latest push toward a codified bill
of rights-i.e., the Community Charter.
As stated above, the European Social Charter binds only
nine of the twelve Member States, unlike the European Con-
vention on Human Rights to which all Community Member
States are party.9 ' The final document was a compromise be-
tween those who sought a binding catalogue of enforceable
rights and those who wanted a mere declaration of intention to
coordinate general social principles.
The preamble to the European Social Charter contains a
blanket non-discrimination clause, followed by a statement of
purpose to pursue "by all appropriate means" the "attainment
of conditions" conducive to the realization of nineteen enu-
merated rights and principles.92 Those rights and principles,
some of which are found in the European Convention on
Human Rights and in the EC treaties,9 3 are developed in detail
in the second part of the European Social Charter. Because it
is the existing bill of European economic and social rights, its
rights as "one of the general principles of Community law," including the elimina-
tion of discrimination based on gender, the Court of Justice observed that generally
the same concepts "are recognized by the European Social Charter ... and by Con-
vention No. 111 of the International Labour Organization." Id. at 1378, 28. It
established that only equal pay was covered by Article 119, not other conditions of
work. Id. at 1379, 33.
91. All twelve Member States have signed the European Social Charter, but
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal have not yet ratified it. The European Parlia-
ment called upon all Member States to do so in its Resolution of Nov. 22, 1989, supra
note 13, Oj. C 323/44, at 47, 11. The European Social Charter was concluded in
1961 under the auspices of the Council of Europe: See generally COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: ORIGINS, OPERATION, RESULTS (1981); D. HARRIS,
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1984) (discussing history of European Social Char-
ter); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CASE LAW ON THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1982) (in-
terpreting various provisions); Riley, The European Social Charter and Community Law, 14
EUR. L. REV. 80 (1989); Gould, The European Social Charter and Community Law-A Com-
ment, 14 EUR. L. REV. 223 (1989).
92. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, preamble.
93. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 119 (establishing right of men and
women to do equal work); see also Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive No.
76/207, regarding access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and
working conditions, O.J. L 39/40 (1976); Curtin, Effective Sanctions and the Equal Treat-
ment Directive: The Van Colson and Harz Cases, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 505 (1985);
S. PRECHAL & N. BURROWS, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY 48-103, 104-64 (1990).
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basic provisions are summarized here and contrasted with the
Community Charter.
First, individuals are guaranteed the freedom to choose
their occupations freely, a right made more effective by guar-
anteed access to free public placement services. The European
Social Charter is more specific than the Community Charter,
mandating, for example, a minimum two-week paid vacation
and additional paid holidays or reduced working hours for
those engaged in dangerous or unhealthy occupations.94 The
Community Charter, like the European Social Charter, leaves
the burden of establishing safe and healthy working conditions
with the Member States. It contains a proviso, however, stat-
ing that "[t]he provisions regarding implementation of the in-
ternal market shall help to ensure such protection."9
The right to fair remuneration, including equal pay for
work of equal value and the right to a reasonable period of
notice for termination, are addressed under different parts of
the Community Charter. These include provisions on garnish-
ment of wages96 and the broader right of men and women to
equal treatment in addition to equal pay.97 Moreover, articles
17 and 18 of the Community Charter provide the rights to in-
formation, consultation, and participation for workers, not just
mere notification of management decisions.98 These measures
are subject to collective bargaining agreements and to the laws
and practices of Member States.
Community Charter provisions on the rights to organize
and bargain collectively differ from the European Social Char-
ter-they stress the need for dialogue between the two sides of
industry at the European level, "in particular at [the] inter-oc-
cupational and sectoral level." 99 The right to strike under the
European Social Charter is qualified by obligations arising
under collective bargaining agreements, while in the Commu-
nity Charter the right is subject to "national regulations and
94. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 2(3)-(4).
95. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 19.
96. Id. art. 5(iii).
97. Id. art. 16.
98. See id. arts. 17-18.
99. Id. art. 12.
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collective agreements."'' 00
The general minimum age (fifteen) established for admis-
sion to employment under the European Social Charter' ° was
raised to sixteen years under the Commission's Draft Commu-
nity Charter, 0 2 but was lowered back to fifteen in the final
text.10 3 The European Social Charter provides a higher mini-
mum age for dangerous and unhealthy occupations and "spe-
cial protection against physical and moral dangers;"'0 4 there
are no comparable provisions in the Community Charter. For
those under eighteen years, the European Social Charter re-
quires not less than three weeks paid vacation, no night work
(with certain exceptions by law or regulation), and mandatory
regular medical control. 0 5 The Community Charter contains
no special provisions for child laborers' holidays or medical
control, but does require that work duration must be limited
and night work prohibited for those under eighteen, except for
"certain jobs laid down in national legislation or regula-
tions."' 1 6 Both Charters require vocational training and equi-
table remuneration for young persons. 10 7
The rights of employed women to protection under the
European Social Charter include paid leave before and after
childbirth up to a total of at least twelve weeks, a prohibition
against dismissal during absence on maternity leave, provision
for sufficient time off for nursing of infants, regulation of night
work in industrial employment, and prohibition of under-
ground mining and all other work which is unsuitable for wo-
men by reasons of its dangerous, unhealthy, or arduous na-
ture. 10 The Community Charter, reflecting both the non-dis-
crimination holdings of the Court of Justice and a seeming
tendency toward less specificity befitting a "bill of rights," in-
100. Id. art. 13. The Commission draft would have subjected it only to "existing
legislation." Draft Community Charter, supra note 1, at 13, 16.
101. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 7. Exceptions are given for
light work. Id. art. 7(1).
102. Draft Community Charter, supra note 1, at 18, 23.
103. See Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 20.
104. European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 7(10).
105. Id. art. 7(7-9).
106. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 22.
107. See id. arts. 21-23; European Social Charter, supra note 6, arts. 7(4)-(5) &
10.
108. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 8.
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stead establishes the rights of men and women to equal treat-
ment;' 0 9 it seeks achievement of that goal not only through
special attention to "access to employment, remuneration,
working conditions, social protection, education, vocational
training and career development," but also through
"[m]easures . . . enabling men and women to reconcile their
occupational and family obligations.""l0 It is doubtful that this
vague wording meets the existing "direct effects" test making
its provisions invocable in national courts. That test is a deter-
mination both that the obligation is sufficiently clear, precise,
and unconditional, and that neither the Community institu-
tions nor the Member States are allowed a margin of discretion
in implementation."' One could argue that the Community
Charter adds little to current protections, but for the remote
possibility that challenges to affirmative action might be de-
feated should the Court ofJustice read Community Charter ar-
ticle 16 as a more than hortatory endorsement of positive dis-
crimination. " t2
Protection for young workers is strengthened in the Com-
109. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 16.
110. Id.
111. See Hurd v. Jones, Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. 29, 83, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,283; see also Defrenne v. SABENA, Case 43/75, 1976 E.C.R. 455, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8346 (establishing that Member States' obligation to ensure
equal pay could impose on private parties a consequential obligation to do so). But
see Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, Case
152/84, 1986 E.C.R. 723, 749, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,295 (contrary hold-
ing). On the horizontal effect of Community measures, that is, their effect between
private individuals, see P.J.G. KAPETYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT, supra note 15, at 333-38;
Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L.
REV. 155 (1983); Arnull, Sanctioning Discrimination, 9 EUR. L. REV. 267 (1984) (review-
ing Van Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, 1984 E.C.R.
1891, 1909, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,092 and Harz v. Deutsche Tradax
GmbH, Case 79/83, 1984 E.C.R. 1921, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,093); see also
Curtin, The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common
Law Context, 15 EUR. L. REV. 195, 220-23 (1990).
112. See Hofmann v. Barmerersatzkasse, Case 184/83, 1984 E.C.R. 3047, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,117; Herdegen, The Relation Between the Principles of Equal-
ity and Proportionality, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 683, 692-96 (1985); see also Burton v.
British Rys. Bd., Case 19/81, 1982 E.C.R. 555, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8808;
Council Directive No. 79/7 on the progressive implementation of the principle of
equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, O.J. L 6/24, at 25,
art. 4 (1979). The European Parliament argues that the Community Charter has the
"potential for jeopardizing existing social rights in certain Member States." Resolu-
tion of Dec. 14, 1989 to wind up the debate on the conclusions of the European
Council, Doc. B3-671/89, O.J. C 15/321, 1 (1990).
COMMUNITY BILL OF RIGHTS
munity Charter to require, "[flollowing the end of compulsory
education.... initial vocational training of a sufficient duration
to enable them to adapt to the requirements of their future
working life; for young workers, such training should take
place during working hours."'"1 3 The Commission's Draft
Community Charter, reflecting the case law of the Court of
Justice, stated that vocational training courses, "including
those at [the] university level," shall be enjoyed by "[e]very
European Community citizen ... on the same terms as those
enjoyed by nationals of the Member State in the territory of
which the courses take place."'"1 4 The final draft, however,
omitted this specific protection.
Under the European Social Charter, the right to health
protection is guaranteed under a most general State commit-
ment to take "appropriate measures . . . to remove as far as
possible the causes of ill-health."' This provision is comple-
mented by a right to social and medical assistance which guar-
antees that those without "adequate resources" be granted
"the care necessitated" by an illness." 6 This right, in the view
of some, creates a compulsory and enforceable obligation
upon States to provide health care." 7 The Community Char-
ter, however, is limited to the rights of workers to health pro-
tection and safety at the workplace, calling merely for
"[a]ppropriate measures" with a view toward "further harmo-
nization of conditions.""' 8 It states that "[any person who
has reached retirement age but who is not entitled to a pension
or who does not have other means of subsistence, must be en-
113. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 23. The Commission draft specified
a period of two years training. Draft Community Charter, supra note 1, at 18, 25.
114. See Draft Community Charter, supra note 1, at 14, 18; see also Gravier,
supra note 38. This can be contrasted with the United States, where tuition fee dis-
crimination on the basis of state citizenship is permitted.
115. European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 11.
116. Id. art. 13(1).
117. In the conclusions of the Committee of Independent Experts on article 13
of the European Social Charter, it was found that it is compulsory for those States
accepting the article to accord assistance to needy persons as of right: "[T]he Con-
tracting Parties are no longer merely empowered to grant assistance as they think fit;
they are under an obligation, which they may be called on in court to honour." Con-
clusions I, 64, as quoted in Council of Europe DH-EX (84)1, at 7, Committee of
Experts for the Extension of the Rights Embodied in the European Convention on
Human Rights, Feb. 20, 1984.
118. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 19.
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titled to sufficient resources and to medical and social assist-
ance specifically suited to his needs," 119 but children and dis-
abled persons are protected only to the extent that they qualify
as workers.1 20
The European Social Charter commits States to the re-
quirements of the International Labour Convention No. 102
concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security,' 2 ' and
obliges them to "raise progressively the system of social secur-
ity to a higher level.' 1 2 2 The Community's existing secondary
legislation on social security protection is reinforced in the
Community Charter by a right to social protection, still sub-
ject, however, to the "arrangements applying in each coun-
try." 123 Community Charter article 10 provides further that
"[e]very worker of the European Community shall have a right
to adequate social protection and shall, whatever his status and
whatever the size of the undertaking in which he is employed,
enjoy an adequate level of social security benefits.' 24 Article
10 also makes mention of unemployed persons no longer eligi-
ble for unemployment benefits, including those who have been
unable to enter the labor market at all, who lack adequate
means of subsistence. 25
Rights of the physically or mentally disabled are strength-
ened in the Community Charter by a guarantee of "concrete
measures" in the areas of "vocational training, ergonomics, ac-
cessibility, mobility, means of transport and housing."' 2 6 The
wording of this provision is mandatory-"[t]hese measures
must concern" at least those mentioned fields.' 2 7 Again, the
question is whether these obligations could be argued to be
sufficiently precise, clear, and unconditional to meet the test of
direct effect, e.g., whether a disabled person may sue under
Community law because his or her State of residence does not
provide housing. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Commu-
119. Id. art. 25.
120. See, e.g., id. arts. 22 & 24 (each referring to "worker").
121. ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) ConventionJune 28, 1952, 210
U.N.T.S. 131.
122. European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 12(3).
123. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 9.
124. Id. art. 10.
125. Id.
126. See id. art. 26.
127. Id.
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nity Charter does not contain a counterpart to the European
Social Charter's undertaking to promote the right of the family
to social, legal, and economic protection by providing for fam-
ily housing and benefits for the newly married. '2  The Com-
munity Charter relies upon a more general guarantee of ade-
quate social protection-"[according to the arrangements ap-
plying in each country."'' 29 Similarly, the European Social
Charter's right of mothers and children to social and economic
protection, 3 0 even though only programmatic in its imple-
mentation, is not specified in the Community Charter.
The right to engage in gainful occupation in the territory
of other Contracting Parties and the right of migrant workers
and their families to protection and assistance are restricted in
the Community Charter to Community citizens. Reflecting the
"People's Europe," the Commission's draft entitled all citi-
zens, not just workers, to "equal treatment with nationals of
the host country in all fields, including social advantages and
taxation."1'31 The final draft, however, restricts this right to
workers.' 3 2 This broad guarantee is qualified on various
grounds, and restrictions may be applied on the basis of public
order, safety, or health.13 3 It is also less broad than the Euro-
pean Social Charter's provision, which mandates that Con-
tracting Patties will not expel workers lawfully residing in their
territories in the absence of a danger to national security or an
offense against public interest or morality. 3 4
The Community Charter's right to freedom of movement
applies to any occupation or profession in the Community, and
implies, inter alia, harmonization of residency requirements,
"particularly those concerning family reunification." 3 5 It calls
special attention to the living and working conditions of work-
ers residing in frontier regions.'3 6 Under the Commission's
draft, guarantees of working conditions and social protection
apply to "Community workers engaged in non-temporary
128. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 16.
129. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 10.
130. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 17.
131. Draft Community Charter, supra note 1, at 6, 3.
132. See Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 10.
133. See id. art. 1.
134. See European Social Charter, supra note 6, art. 19(8).
135. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 3(i).
136. See id. art. 3(iii).
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gainful employment in a Member State other than their coun-
try of origin," implying that temporary employees are ex-
cluded not only with respect to public works contracts, 3 7 but
also with respect to subcontracting services.' 3l  These articles
were designed to address the possibility that, for example, a
Greek construction company might import temporary labor for
a building project in Germany, having won a competitive bid
by avoiding the social costs mandated for workers under Ger-
man law. The articles, however, were excluded from the final
version.
Community Charter article 27 stipulates that it is "the re-
sponsibility of the Member States, in accordance with national
practices, notably through legislative measures or collective
agreements, to guarantee the fundamental social rights in this
Charter . . . . ,1'39 The Commission was invited to present an
action program "as soon as possible ...with a view to the
adoption of legal instruments for ... effective implementation
.... 140 It was also instructed to submit yearly implementa-
tion reports to the European Council (not to the Council of
Ministers), the European Parliament, and the Economic and
Social Committee.' 4 ' The Commission communicated a pro-
gram to the Council of Ministers on November 29, 1989, stat-
ing that "responsibility for the initiatives to be taken as regards
the implementation of social rights lies with the Member
States, their constituent parts on the two sides of industry as
well as, within the limits of its powers, with the European Com-
munity." 142  This somewhat non-commital view seems to re-
strict a presumption of Community preemption in the fields
137. Draft Community Charter, supra note 1, at 7, 5. /
138. Id. art. 6.
139. Community Charter, supra note 2, art. 27.
140. Id. art. 28.'
141. See id. arts. 29-30.
142. Communication from the Commission concerning Its Action Programme
Relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for
Workers, COM(89) 568 final, Nov. 29, 1989, at 4, 3 [hereinafter Communication].
The "new initiatives" contain a number of revived proposals, many of which have not
yet been acted upon by the Council. They also contain various monitoring, report-
ing, and evaluating efforts, some of which had been undertaken previously under
different guises. In January 1989, for example, the Commission proposed revision of
two Council directives concerning free movement of workers (1612/68 and 68/360),
explaining that if such revision should succeed, it would propose amendment of its
regulation ofJune 19, 1970 (Regulation 1251/70) "on the right of workers to remain
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covered and to weaken the claim that the enumerated rights
may be directly enforceable. Nonetheless, such a position
could at least be argued in a Member State court, should that
State fail to take measures in a clearly prescribed area.
CONCLUSION
Giving content to human rights, making them more than
mere platitudes or declarations of good intention, is a formida-
ble and often unsuccessful task. The Community has thus far
avoided the creation of a bill of rights, even by accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European So-
cial Charter. These seemingly apparent steps should be easy
on the territory of a Member State after [being] employed in that State" in order to
strengthen the principle of equal treatment. Communication, supra, at 22-23.
The proposal for a Community instrument on procedures for the information,
consultation, and participation of workers in European-scale undertakings contains a
recital of frustrated initiatives. id. at 32-33. It includes the principles that
"[i]nformation must be provided and consultations should take place before taking
any decision liable to have serious consequences for the interests of employees, in
particular, closures, transfers, curtailment of activities, substantial changes with re-
gard to organization, working practices, production methods, long-term cooperation
with other undertakings, etc." Id. at 33. The Commission has indicated that the
proposal will be accompanied by an instrument on equity-sharing and financial par-
ticipation by workers. Id. at 33-34.
The recommendations concerning equal treatment for men and women include,
inter alia, re-endorsement of an initiative on parental leave proposed to the Council of
Ministers in 1982. There are no specific proposals for child care provision at the
Community level. For its proposed Code of Good Conduct on the Protection of
Pregnancy and Maternity, the Commission reiterates that the principle of sub-
sidiarity, i.e., national control, should be respected, stating that "the Community
should only intervene further if necessary." Id. at 38.
In the area of vocational training, the Commission calls in its implementation
report for an updating of its 1963 proposal for a Council decision on the general
principles for implementing a common vocational policy, particularly "in the light of
the definition of the notion of vocational training given by the Court of Justice in
recent judgments." Id. at 41. There have been ten proposals for directives
presented to the Council concerning safety, health, and hygiene at work since Octo-
ber 1987, three of which had been adopted at the time of the Commission's commu-
nication. Id. at 43-44. They include a proposal for the establishment of an agency to
monitor progress in the field. Id. at 48.
On the protection of children and adolescents, the Commission calls for a Coun-
cil directive on approximation of laws. Id. at 50. For the elderly, while "most action
in this area falls within the direct responsibility of the Member States," a draft deci-
sion on an action program providing for pilot projects and exchanges of communica-
tion between groups representing the elderly is envisaged. Id. at 51. For the dis-
abled, the Commission plans to propose a Council decision establishing a third Com-
munity action program for the period 1992-1996. Id. at 54.
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as all Member States have already accepted the former and
most have accepted, albeit with reservations, the latter. In-
stead, the protection of individuals vis-d-vis the Community has
been left largely to ad hoc, case-by-case determination by the
Court of Justice. The result is a common or customary law
amalgam of declarations and decisions that should suffice with
less comfort for the civil law Member States.
The Community Charter is a partial step toward the con-
stitutionalization of a bill of individual and collective human
rights, an effort that would be strengthened by parallel Com-
munity accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights. One of the less often stated objections to both steps by
the British Government is that within the discretion of the
Court of Justice is the legal possibility that the rights both in-
struments contain would have direct effect--i.e., they could be
invoked by U.K. citizens in U.K. courts, superceding anterior
or posterior U.K. law. These objections are similar to those
raised by signatory states, like the United States, which are re-
luctant to ratify the United Nations Covenants on Civil and
Political and Economic and Social Rights.
Civil and political as well as economic and social rights are
implicated by the ever-expanding jurisdiction of the Commu-
nity. To assume benevolently that the Community's conduct
will always be such that it will not violate the rights of citizens
who empower it is to ignore the constitutional wisdom of its
constituent parts. As a federated Europe comes closer to real-
ity, it is essential that its institutional framework contain ex-
plicit, invocable, and directly effective fundamental protections
for those whom the governments are designed to serve.
